Introduction
One of the lessons learned from the 2007-2009 US financial crisis is that undercapitalization of large financial institutions can impose significant negative externalities on the real economy. When the economy is in a downturn, the bankruptcy of a firm cannot be absorbed by a stronger competitor. Obligations will spread throughout both the financial and real economy and the natural functions of the financial sector will be curtailed.
When the system is undercapitalized, it will no longer supply credit for ordinary everyday business and the economy will suffer. Thus, a capital shortfall is dangerous for a firm and its bondholders, but it is also dangerous for the whole economy if it occurs just when the rest of the financial sector is undercapitalized.
A number of contributions that focus on the analysis of 2007-2009 financial crisis
have introduced theoretical models that formalize this intuition. Among others, Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) develop a model in which the capital shortfall experienced by a financial firm when the financial system is undercapitalized generates negative externalities to the entire economy. In their framework, the vulnerability of the financial system arises because firms do not take into account the negative externality costs that they generate in a crisis. Firms that take excessive risk will face higher costs of capital from market participants but will not be charged for the externalities they impose on the real economy. The higher profit opportunities encourage others to also raise risk limits. This creates the need for appropriate tools for supervisors to measure the degree of undercapitalization a financial firm would experience, conditional on severe distress in the entire system. These considerations motivate us to introduce an empirical methodology to measure the systemic risk contribution of financial firms. We introduce a measure called SRISK defined as the expected capital shortfall of a financial entity conditional on a prolonged market decline. SRISK is a function of the size of the firm, its degree of leverage, and its expected equity loss conditional on the market decline, which we call Long Run Marginal Expected Shortfall (LRMES). The measure can readily be computed using balance sheet information and an appropriate LRMES estimator. SRISK is used to construct rankings of systemically risky institutions: Firms with the highest SRISK are the largest contributors to the undercapitalization of the financial system in times of distress. The sum of SRISK across all firms is used as an measure of overall systemic risk in the entire financial system.
It can be thought of as the total amount of capital that the government would have to provide to bail out the financial system in case of a crisis. Reserve Bank carried out several programs to provide capital to those financial firms that experienced a capital shortfall. A natural evaluation exercise for our methodology consists of assessing whether pre-crisis SRISK predicts the capital injections carried out by the Fed during the crisis. We address this question using the Bloomberg Loan Crisis Data database, a dataset containing details of such operations recently analyzed in a number of studies (as in Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012) . Regression results show that SRISK is a significant predictor of the capital injections. The finding is robust to the inclusion of a number of controls including firm size and alternative capital shortfall indices.
The majority of systemic risk definitions proposed in the literature emphasize that systemic risk has negative spillover effects on the real economy. To this extent, we investigate whether aggregate SRISK provides early warning signals of worsening macroeconomic conditions. Specifically, we use predictive regressions of the future growth rates of industrial production and the unemployment rate on the growth rate of aggregate SRISK (analogously to Allen, Bali, and Tang, 2012) . The forecasting horizon of the regressions varies from one month to twelve months. Results show that an increase in SRISK predicts future declines in industrial production and increases in the unemployment rate, and that the predictive ability of aggregate SRISK is stronger at longer horizons. Prediction results are robust to the inclusion of a large set of alternative control predictors that includes systematic risk (measured as the volatility of the market), the SRISK measure computed for non-financial firms, an aggregate capital shortfall index computed from a structural Merton-type default risk model, the default spread, the term spread, and an index measuring the degree of activity of the US housing market.
A number of additional checks are carried out to assess the robustness and sensitivity of our empirical evidence. First, we are concerned with determining the extent to which SRISK measures a different dimension of risk that is not already captured by other indices. To do so, we compare the SRISK rankings with those provided by a number of firm characteristic and alternative risk measures. We find that the rank correlation between SRISK and these alternatives is positive in the majority of the cases, though of modest magnitude. Next, we investigate the sensitivity of SRISK to the choice of its tuning parameters. We find that the rankings are stable for reasonable ranges of their values. Last, we address the choice of the LRMES estimator for SRISK. We argue that systemic risk monitoring ought to be based on indices that are able to promptly adapt to rapidly changing market conditions. To this extent we investigate which LRMES estimator delivers an aggregate SRISK measure that cannot be anticipated by an alternative aggregate SRISK measure based on a different LRMES estimator. Results show that LRMES estimation based on the standard GARCH-DCC time series model strikes a good balance between prediction accuracy and model complexity. This paper contributes to the literature on systemic risk measurement, and more precisely to the strand of the literature proposing market-based indices of systemic distress. Bisias, Flood, Lo, and Valavanis (2012) and Sylvain, Colliard, Hurlin, and Pérignon (2016) contain recent surveys on this literature. The CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) links the systemic risk contribution of a financial institution with the increase of the VaR of the entire financial system which is associated with that financial entity being under stress. Allen et al. (2012) propose a system wide systemic risk index called CATFIN, which associates systemic risk to the VaR of the financial system. Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2011) measure systemic risk as the marginal contribution of a financial firm to the distress insurance premium of the financial sector. A large number of contributions on market-based systemic risk measurement associate this risk with the degree of interdependence among financial firms, as in Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2006) . Research in this strand of the literature includes, among others, the work of Billio, Getmansky, Lo, and Pellizzon (2012), Ang and Longstaff (2013) , Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2014) , and Zhang, Schwaab, and Lucas (2014) . The main difference between our proposal and the majority of market based systemic risk indices, is that SRISK merges market and balance sheet information in order to construct a marketbased measure of financial distress, which is the expected capital shortfall of a financial firm conditional on a systemic event. SRISK does not just depend on equity volatility and correlation (or other moments of the equity return distribution), but it also explicitly depends on the size and the degree of leverage of a financial firm.
Our contribution is also related to that of Acharya et al. (2010) who also propose a systemic risk measure, called Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES), which measures the conditional capital shortfall of a financial firm. Their estimation approach however is based on structural assumptions and requires observing a realization of the systemic crisis for estimation, thus their methodology cannot be used for ex-ante measurement. Ignoring the look ahead bias of SES, our empirical analysis shows that SRISK has significantly higher predictive power than SES. This paper is also related to Acharya, Engle, and Pierret (2014) who carry out a comparison between the capital shortfall estimates of systemic risk institutions provided by SRISK and regulatory stress tests (based on supervisory data).
Their analysis shows that regulatory capital shortfalls measured relative to total assets provide similar rankings to SRISK for US stress tests. On the other hand, rankings are substantially different when the regulatory capital shortfalls are measured relative to risk-weighted assets. Greater differences are observed in the European stress tests.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the SRISK methodology. Section 3 describes the panel of US financial firms analyzed in this work and details the estimation of SRISK for this dataset. Section 4 presents the time series evolution and cross-sectional rankings of SRISK. Section 5 contains the results of the predictive analysis of SRISK. Section 6 carries out a number of additional robustness and sensitivity checks.
Concluding remarks follow in Section 7.
Systemic Risk Measurement
The objective of the SRISK methodology is to measure the capital shortfall a financial firm is expected to experience conditional on a systemic event. The SRISK calculation is analogous to the stress tests that are regularly applied to financial firms. However, here it is done with publicly available information only, making the index widely applicable and relatively inexpensive to implement.
Conditional Capital Shortfall
We are concerned with monitoring a financial system made up of N financial institutions.
The variable we introduce to measure the distress of a financial firm is its capital shortfall, which is here taken as the capital reserves the firm needs to hold (because of regulation and/or prudential management) minus the firm's equity. Formally, we define the capital shortfall of firm i on day t as
where W i t is the market value of equity, D i t is the book value of debt, A i t is the value of quasi assets and k is the prudential capital fraction. In particular, in this work we set the prudential capital fraction k to 8%. The capital shortfall can be thought of as the negative of the working capital of the firm. When the capital shortfall is negative, i.e., the firm has a capital surplus, the firm functions properly. On the other hand, when this quantity is positive the firm experiences distress.
We are concerned with predicting the capital shortfall of a financial entity in case of a systemic event. Different definitions of systemic event can be adopted. Here we define it as a market decline below a threshold C over a time horizon h. The justification for this choice comes from the model of Acharya et al. (2010) , where the capital shortfall of a firm generates negative externalities if it occurs when the system is already in distress. Also, in order to produce a meaningful stressed capital shortfall measure, we implicitly assume that the systemic event corresponds to a sufficiently extreme scenario. We denote the multi-period arithmetic market return between period t + 1 and t + h as R m t+1:t+h and the systemic event as {R m t+1:t+h < C}. In this work we set the horizon h to one month (that is 22 periods) and the threshold C to −10%. We define SRISK as the expected capital shortfall conditional on a systemic event
In order to compute this expectation we further assume that in the case of a systemic event debt cannot be renegotiated, implying that E t (D i t+h |R m t+1:t+h < C) = D i t . Using this assumption it follows that
where LVG i t denotes the quasi-leverage ratio (D i t + W i t )/W i t and LRMES i t is Long Run MES, the expectation of the firm equity multi-period arithmetic return conditional on the systemic event, that is
where R i t+1:t+h is the multi-period arithmetic firm equity return between period t + 1
and t + h. Formula (1) shows that SRISK is a function of the size of the firm, its degree of leverage, and its expected equity devaluation conditional on a market decline. SRISK is higher for firms that are larger, more leveraged and with higher sensitivity to market declines. Note that, for simplicity, the dependence on the prudential ratio k, the threshold C and the time horizon h is implicit in the SRISK notation
The SRISK measure of equation (1) provides a point prediction of the level of capital shortfall a financial entity would experience in case of a systemic event. It is also interesting to define the 1 − α capital shortfall prediction interval conditional on the systemic event as
where
with F i t+1:t+h|t (x) denoting the distribution function of the firm multi-period return conditional on the systemic event.
We use the SRISK i t measure across all firms to construct a system wide measure of financial distress. The total amount of systemic risk in the financial system is measured
where (x) + denotes max(x, 0). Aggregate SRISK t can be thought of as the total amount of capital that the government would have to provide to bail out the financial system conditional on the systemic event. Notice that in the computation of aggregate SRISK we ignore the contribution of negative capital shortfalls (that is capital surpluses). In a crisis it is unlikely that surplus capital will be easily mobilized through mergers or loans.
Thus, it will not necessarily be available to support failing firms.
Rather than reporting the SRISK measure it is often more insightful to report its percentage version. We define the percentage SRISK measure as
and zero otherwise. SRISK% can be interpreted as a systemic risk share.
Long Run Marginal Expected Shortfall
The computation of SRISK requires specifying a model for the market and firm returns that can be used to obtain estimators of the LRMES. A number of different specifications and estimation techniques can be used to obtain this prediction. In this work we construct LRMES predictions using a GARCH-DCC model (Engle, 2002 (Engle, , 2009 ). The GARCH-DCC methodology is widely used in financial time series analysis as this class of models is able to capture well the stylized facts of the data.
Let the logarithmic returns of the firm and the market be denoted respectively as r i t = log(1+R i t ) and r m t = log(1+R m t ). We assume that conditional on the information set F t−1 available at time t − 1, the return pair has an (unspecified) distribution D with zero mean and time varying covariance,
This approach requires specifying equations for the evolution of the time varying volatilities and correlation. We opt for the GJR-GARCH volatility model and the standard DCC correlation model (Glosten, Jagananthan, and Runkle, 1993; Rabemananjara and Zakoïan, 1993; Engle, 2002) . The GJR-GARCH model equations for the volatility dy-namics are 
where Q i t is the so-called pseudo correlation matrix. The DCC model then specifies the dynamics of the pseudo-correlation matrix Q i t as
where S i is the unconditional correlation matrix of the firm and market adjusted returns.
The model is typically estimated by a two step QML estimation procedure. More extensive details on this modeling approach and estimation are provided in Engle (2009) . In what follows we refer to this specification as GARCH-DCC for short.
LRMES is in general not available in closed form for this class of dynamic models.
However, it is straightforward to implement a simulation based procedure to obtain exact LRMES predictions. The procedure consists of simulating a random sample of size S of h-period firm and market arithmetic returns conditional on the information set available
These are computed by simulating a path of logarithmic returns of length h conditional on the information set on day t, computing the cumulative logarithmic return (which is the sum of the path) and then converting this into the arithmetic h-period return (by exponentiating and subtracting one). The LRMES for day t is then calculated using the Monte Carlo average of the simulated arithmetic h-period returns,
A detailed description of the simulation algorithm is provided in the Appendix. An appealing feature of the simulation based procedure is that it also allows us to compute the capital shortfall prediction intervals of formula (2) using the quantiles of the simulated returns. Notice that in the algorithm the innovations are simulated by resampling the standardized residuals of the GARCH-DCC rather than relying on parametric assumptions. We point out that recently Duan and Zhang (2015) have introduced an efficient algorithm for the computation of LRMES based on bridge-sampling.
For comparison purposes, in the empirical application we also consider two alternative approaches to construct LRMES forecasts. The first one is based on a static bivariate normal model and the second on a dynamic bivariate copula model.
In the static bivariate normal framework, the firm and market logarithmic returns are assumed to be iid from a bivariate normal distribution with zero mean. The market volatility, firm volatility and correlation parameters are denoted respectively as σ m , σ i and ρ. In this setting, LRMES can be simply approximated by
with φ(·) and Φ(·) denoting respectively the density and distribution of a standard normal, and c = log(1 + C)/ √ h. Reading from right to left, LRMES is the product of the oneperiod market expected shortfall (defined using logarithmic returns), market beta and the square root of the forecast horizon. Importantly, note that even with a static model and normal shocks LRMES is an increasing function of market volatility. We note that formula (4) has a negative approximation error and should be used for short horizon prediction only.
1
Finally, we also consider a more sophisticated nonlinear dynamic specification that models the nonlinear tail dependence of firm and market logarithmic returns using copulas.
Different dynamic copula specifications have been proposed in the literature. In this work we resort to the dynamic bivariate copula model of Patton (2006) . This class of models is appealing in that it focuses directly on modeling the joint tail dependence of the firm and market returns. We provide details of this alternative specification in the Appendix.
Discussion
A number of remarks on the SRISK methodology we propose are in order.
SRISK is a forward looking, market-based measure of a firm's net worth incorporating the distribution of future assets conditional on a systemic event. An important characteristic of our measurement approach is that it merges together balance sheet and market information to estimate the conditional capital shortfall of a firm. The capital shortfall could be measured using solely the accounting value of assets and liabilities. On the other hand, the market value of the equity of the firm provides a market estimate of the future value of the firm, which may differ from the accounting value because the assets or liabilities are evaluated differently from the accounting figures, and also because the market value is forward looking and may take into account factors that have yet to occur. Naturally enough, the conditional capital shortfall measure proposed in this work makes a number of simplifying assumptions in order to deliver a measure that can be easily computed in practice. Among the possible extensions of the baseline model, one could think of using different values of the prudential capital ratio k for different types of 1 In the static bivariate normal case, the exact closed form expression for LRMES is
where erf(·) is the error function.
institutions and/or types of assets. Also, one limitation of the measure that one has to bear in mind is that it does not employ off-balance sheet information, and to this extent it might not appropriately capture the true asset structure of a firm.
The value of the prudential capital ratio k that we use is based on the capital ratio maintained by well managed large financial institutions in normal times. For instance, a rough back of the envelope calculation shows that from summer 2009 to spring 2011 the prudential capital ratio used by Wells Fargo averaged around 10% while JPM was closer to 7%. In this work we use 8% for our analysis and show later in the robustness checks section that ranking results are substantially stable in a reasonable range of values of k.
We acknowledge that there is a current debate on the optimal capital ratio and that in particular Admati and Hellwig (2013) argue that the ratio should be much higher. Our results do not inform this debate except to show the consequences for capital shortfall.
As far as the choice of the systemic event parameters h and C is concerned, we emphasize that the systemic event used for the SRISK calculation should entail a sufficiently long horizon h and extreme threshold loss C. Otherwise, when the horizon is short and the threshold is modest, the role of risk is dramatically reduced and SRISK reflects the current capital shortfall of an institution rather than the stressed conditional capital shortfall. In this work we set the horizon h to a month in order to compare more naturally our methodology with other monthly frequency indicators of distress. On the other hand, the empirical implementation of SRISK for systemic risk monitoring can be based on different choices of these parameters and, in particular, it can be based on a longer horizon.
SRISK assumes the triggering systemic event of the financial crisis is a prolonged market decline. It is natural to associate the fragility of the financial system with the conditional capital shortfall that the industry would suffer in times of distress. Because of the extensive use of leverage made in the financial sector, this industry is particularly vulnerable to downward market movements. De Bandt and Hartmann (2002) report that many banking crises have occurred in conjunction with aggregate shocks or cyclical downturns. We do not make any assumptions about the direction of causality. Our calculation is on the expected value of one endogenous variable conditioned on the value of another. The most common interpretation is that if the financial sector is undercapitalized and cannot survive a substantial downturn in the economy, this can in and of itself precipitate such a down turn. The macrofinance underpinnings of this process are topics of current research but include the negative impacts of asset sales and other forms of delevering and the failure to supply sufficient capital to the real economy. See for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) .
Our notion of systemic risk assumes that the capital shortfall of the financial system has spillover effects on the real economy. Generally speaking, most systemic risk definitions typically assume the existence of these types of linkages. Empirically, Hoggarth, Reis, and Saporta (2002) find that output losses incurred during banking crisis periods are large. Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2013) analyse nearly 200 recession episodes over a long historical span and across different countries, and document that a stronger increase in financial leverage before a recession leads to deeper subsequent downturn in the economy. One of the main channels through which a capital shortfall in the financial sector spills over to the real economy is lending. If the financial system is capital constrained, the availability of credit will dry up. This will adversely constrain businesses and will end up negatively affecting output and unemployment. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) document evidence of a substantial reduction in lending activity during the [2007] [2008] [2009] financial crisis that originated from the supply side.
Our methodology is close in spirit to the classic Merton type structural approach that is at the core of credit risk models such as Moody's KMV. The key difference between that approach and ours is that we are concerned with measuring the distress a financial institution is going to suffer conditional on a systemic event which affects the entire system. On the other hand, systemic risk indices proposed on the basis of Merton-type models like Lehar (2005) focus on measuring the capital shortfall in case of a firm default.
In our view the default of a single financial institution, if it occurs under usual market conditions, should in principal be absorbed by the system and does not lead necessarily to systemic threats.
The systemic risk measurement methodology put forward in this paper differs from a number of contributions in the literature. Since the work of, among others, Hartmann et al. (2006) , market-based measurement approaches often associate systemic risk with the probability of joint distress of a large proportion of firms in the financial system.
On the other hand, in this work we emphasize that systemic risk is determined by the capital shortfall generated by distressed institutions conditional on a systemic event. Our framework takes into account joint dependence among firms, as well as their size and the degree of leverage. Thus our framework is able to detect if a small number of large financial institutions pose systemic threats to the entire system.
The measurement approach proposed to compute conditional capital shortfalls is general and can be applied to other types of firms. However, non-financial firms are not expected to be as highly leveraged and vulnerable as financial firms. Moreover, it is less clear through which channels the capital shortfall of a non-financial firm would negatively affect the whole economy. In the prediction section of the paper we investigate this question empirically by comparing (financial) SRISK with a version of the SRISK computed using only non-financial firms. 
Data and Capital Shortfall Estimation

Alternative Capital Shortfall Measures
In the empirical analysis we compare SRISK with a set of alternative capital shortfall measures. We provide here details on these alternative indices and their computation. sion are used to compute realized SES, which can then be used for ranking purposes. In their work, one-day ahead MES is estimated as the sample average of the firm's equity arithmetic returns on the days in which the market return is lower than its 5% quantile.
In order to account for time-variation, the average is computed using a rolling window estimation scheme. Naturally enough, it is unclear how SES can be estimated in real time, as it requires observing a systemic crisis to infer the level of systemic risk of an
institution. In what follows we produce SES estimates using the latest figures of one-step ahead MES and Leverage available and the SES coefficients based on the estimation results carried out in Acharya et al. (2010) . One-day ahead MES is computed on the basis of a GARCH-DCC model. Lehar (2005) makes an important contribution to the systemic risk literature by proposing to use a standard Merton-type default model to monitor the financial system (see also Gray, Merton, and Bodie, 2007) . Among other quantities, he introduces the capital Expected Shortfall (ES) which is defined as the amount of debt that cannot be covered by the assets in case of default. Moreover, he proposes the total sum of Expected Shortfalls, which we label here as TES, as an index of overall distress. We construct the ES and TES following closely the steps outlined in Lehar (2005) and using methods developed in Duan (1994) to carry out inference on the Merton model. We make one exception to his procedure only, which consists of estimating the shortfalls using daily data rather than monthly using a two year rolling window.
In this work we emphasize that SRISK measures the systemic risk associated with the capital shortfall of the financial system. It is natural to ask whether SRISK may capture distress irrespective of which category of firms it is constructed from. To this extent,
we construct a non-financial SRISK measure and we compare it to (financial) SRISK.
We build the measure using all US non-financial firms (SIC code larger than 5999 and smaller than 7000) with a market capitalization larger than 5 bln USD as of the end of 5 Predictive Power of SRISK
SRISK as a Predictor of Fed Capital Injections
The regulatory framework developed in the aftermath of the financial crisis puts special emphasis on identifying Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) that can pose threats to the entire economy. In this work we identify such institutions as those firms which experience large capital shortfalls during times of severe market distress.
From a regulatory perspective this can be justified on the grounds that the firms with the largest capital shortfalls are those that will require the largest capital injections in case the supervisor decides to intervene to bail out the financial system following a systemic event.
These considerations suggest that a natural evaluation of our methodology consists We carry out this analysis using the Bloomberg Loan Crisis Data, a Bloomberg compiled dataset containing records of all financial firms that received capital injections from the Fed during the crisis. This dataset has recently been analyzed in Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) , which provides a detailed assessment of the programs. Their study shows that government and firm incentives played a crucial role in the way the programs were implemented, and that the Fed injections are a useful, yet imperfect, proxy of the actual capital needs of the firms during the crisis.
We use a Tobit regression model to assess the significance of SRISK as a predictor of the Fed injections. Let CI * i denote the capital injection received by institution i during the crisis. We assume that the equation that determines the capital needs of firm i is
where x i is a vector of control explanatory variables and i is a Gaussian random error term assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors. We assume that the capital injection is carried out only if the amount to be injected is positive. This implies that the econometrician observes a censored version of log CI * i defined as
The model described in equations 5 and 6 is a standard Tobit regression model that can be consistently estimated by maximum likelihood. We measure the Tetlow (2015), for example, provide empirical evidence that the linkages between financial frictions and the macroeconomy become relevant when the financial system is distressed and not operating normally.
Here we focus on assessing if an increase in SRISK predicts future declines in industrial production and the unemployment rate. To this extent we employ an h-step ahead predictive regression using monthly frequency data whose general form is given by
where y t+h denotes either the h-step ahead monthly log change in industrial production or the h-step ahead monthly change in the unemployment rate, ∆ log SRISK t is the monthly growth rate of aggregate SRISK, x t is a vector of control predictor variables, and u t is a random error term assumed to be uncorrelated with the predictors. The set of control variables contains the S&P500 return; the default spread change, defined as the change in the difference of BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds; the term spread change, defined as the change in the difference of the ten year T-bond and one month T-bill yields; and the Table 5 contains detailed results for a subset of the predictive regressions using industrial production as the dependent variable. The table reports the estimated coefficients of equation (7) together with robust standard errors and adjusted R 2 statistics for all forecasting horizons from one month to twelve months ahead. The table also reports the increment of the (standard) R 2 due to the inclusion of the lagged values of SRISK. The estimation results show that SRISK is negative and significant for the vast majority of forecasting horizons. SRISK is also the main predictor which contributes to long horizon predictability, as lagged values of industrial production and the control predictors have significant estimates at short and medium horizons only. Overall, the estimation results convey that an increase in aggregate SRISK predicts a drop in future industrial production, which, judging from the increment of the R 2 statistic, has an economically meaningful magnitude.
[
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
We summarise the overall evidence of the predictive regression exercise in row (a) of We set the number of lags in the Newey-West HAC formula equal to the optimal bandwidth formula provided in Newey and West (1987) plus the length of the horizon h of the predictive regression.
5 The joint F-test across multiple horizons is carried out by stacking the predictive regressions in a SUR system. Parameter estimates are obtained by Least Squares and robust standard errors are computed using the Newey-West HAC estimator with bandwidth equal to the optimal bandwidth formula provided in Newey and West (1987) plus the length of the maximum horizon h of the predictive regressions. [
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
We consider an augmented version of the predictive regression of equation (7) y
where z t denotes the growth rate of either non-financial SRISK, the VIX or TES. The model is estimated using the same steps outlined previously.
We report summary results obtained from the predictive model of equation (8) months, 7 to 9 months and 10 to 12 months). The table also reports the average adjusted R 2 of the predictive regressions across the same horizons. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimation results respectively with and without controls.
Non-financial SRISK is strongly significant at short horizons for industrial production and has some weak significance for the unemployment rate when considering the regression model without control predictors. When considering the augmented specification with controls, most of its significance is substantially weakened. On the other hand, (financial) SRISK is significant and the inclusion of non-financial SRISK does not affect its long horizon predictive ability. As far as the VIX is concerned, the results show that this indicator is strongly significant at short horizons for industrial production and medium horizons for the unemployment rate when considering the regression model without controls. However, most of its significance disappears and does not have a clear pattern once considering controls. SRISK on the other hand is still significant at long horizons even in this case. Finally, TES is significant across almost all horizons when considering the regression model without control predictors. Interestingly, after controls are included, most of its significance is still retained. Again, SRISK is still significant at long horizons and its significance is robust to the inclusion of this indicator as well. It is important to emphasize that the inclusion of the alternative predictors does not contribute much to increasing the adjusted R 2 of the predictive regressions, especially at longer horizons.
6 Additional Robustness Checks
SRISK Rankings Comparison
In this section we compare the SRISK rankings with the ones obtained from a set of firm characteristic and alternative risk measures. The objective here is to assess how similar SRISK rankings are to the ones provided by these alternative indices. The firm characteristics we consider are assets, defined as the book value of assets; equity, defined as the market value of equity; debt, defined as the book value of debt; and leverage, defined as the ratio of the book value of debt to the market value of equity. The set of risk measures are SES; ES; LRMES, computed using formula (3) on the basis of a GARCH-DCC model and taken in absolute value; and volatility, measured as the conditional standard deviation of firm returns estimated with a GJR-GARCH model. On each of the ranking dates of table 3, we compute Spearman's correlation between the SRISK rankings and the rankings provided by the other indices. The indices are computed using the latest data available as of each date. Table 7 reports the results of the comparison. In general, Spearman's correlation between SRISK and the other indices is often significantly positive but it never exceeds 0.40. The indices that have highest rank correlation are those that also enter in the SRISK formula, that is LRMES and leverage.
[INSERT 
SRISK Rankings Sensitivity
In this section we assess the sensitivity of the SRISK rankings to the choice of the SRISK parameters and LRMES estimator. On each of the ranking dates of table 3, we compute Spearman's correlation between the SRISK rankings obtained from our proposed approach and a number of modifications of the default settings. We consider: increasing the prudential capital ratio k to 10%, decreasing the systemic event threshold C to −20%, using the LRMES estimator based on the static normal model (using formula 4), and using the LRMES estimator based on the dynamic copula model. The results of the comparison are reported in table 8. Overall, results show that the rank correlation is high and is above 0.90 in the majority of cases. As far as the choice of the SRISK parameters is concerned, detailed inspection of the results (not reported in the paper) shows that the companies at the low end of the rankings are quite sensitive to changes to k and C.
On the other hand, the top positions are relatively stable for reasonable choices of these parameters.
6 It is straightforward to see from equation (1) that SRISK increases when k increases or C decreases. However, in our dataset the SRISK time series profile and the SRISK rankings are not influenced excessively by the choice of these parameters. Looking at the different LRMES estimators, we note that the rankings based on the static normal and dynamic copula models are fairly similar to the ones provided by GARCH-DCC.
Interestingly, ranking differences become more pronounced in the crisis period, especially the ones with the static normal model. This is the consequence of the fact that volatility and correlation dynamics become more hectic during the crisis, and the differences between the LRMES estimators become more pronounced, especially those between static and dynamic models.
SRISK Timeliness
A supervisor performing real time systemic risk monitoring is interested in using measures that promptly adapt to current market conditions. To this extent, we investigate here which LRMES estimator provides the most timely SRISK. We consider aggregate SRISK computed using three variants of the LRMES estimator: GARCH-DCC, static normal (based on 4) and dynamic copula. For each pair of LRMES estimators (A, B), we consider a Granger causality test based on the following predictive regression
where ∆ log SRISK A t and ∆ log SRISK B t are the log growth rates of the aggregate SRISK based on estimators A and B, and u t is an error term. We say that the SRISK measure based on LRMES estimator B leads the one based on estimator A if β is significantly different from zero. We carry out this test for each combination of LRMES estimators in order to determine the lead/lag relations among the different SRISK indices. We say that a LRMES estimator is timely if it provides an SRISK measure that is not lead by any other SRISK measure based on an alternative LRMES estimator. We estimate the coefficients of equation (9) by Least Squares and compute robust standard errors using the Newey-West covariance estimator (using the standard plug-in formula for the bandwidth parameter). We report the results of the Granger causality test in table 9. For each pair of estimators, the table reports the estimate of the β coefficient, its standard error as well as the R 2 of the regression. The table shows that the SRISK indices based on the dynamic models (GARCH-DCC and dynamic copula) lead SRISK based on the static one. On the other hand, static LRMES based SRISK never leads the dynamic ones. The table also shows that GARCH-DCC leads the dynamic copula model, however the significance is weak. Overal, the results convey that dynamic models and that the GARCH-DCC in particular provide a timely SRISK measure.
Conclusions
The 2007-2009 financial crisis highlighted the need for better tools to measure systemic risk. In this paper we propose a systemic risk measure called SRISK that measures the expected capital shortfall of a financial institution conditional on a prolonged and severe market decline. SRISK is a function of the size, the leverage and the LRMES of the firm.
The measure can be computed using balance sheet data and an appropriate LRMES estimator.
We use this methodology to analyze the systemic risk of top U.S. financial firms between 2005 and 2012. The SRISK analysis provides useful insights for monitoring the financial system and, retrospectively, it captures several of the early signs of the crisis. Among other findings, we show that pre-crisis SRISK is a predictor of the capital injections performed by the Fed during the crisis and that an increase in aggregate SRISK provides an early warning signal of a decline in industrial production and an increase in the unemployment rate.
A Appendix
A.1 Simulation Algorithm for LRMES.
This section describes the simulation based procedure we use to construct LRMES forecasts. Specifically, we are interested in computing the LRMES of firm i on period T at horizon h and conditional on a market decline equal to C,
In what follows we assume parameters to be known while in practice we use estimated parameters using all of the information available up to time T .
Construct the GARCH-DCC standardized innovations
for each t = 1, ..., T . Note that by construction m t and ξ i t are zero mean, unit variance and cross-sectionally as well as serially uncorrelated.
2. Sample with replacement S×h pairs of standardized innovations [ξ i t , m t ] . Use these to construct S pseudo samples of GARCH-DCC innovations from period T + 1 to
3. Use the pseudo samples of GARCH-DCC innovations as inputs of the the DCC and GARCH filters respectively using as initial conditions the last values of the conditional correlation ρ i T and variances σ 
Note that a number of algorithmic shortcuts can be implemented to substantially reduce the computational burden associated with the LRMES computation in large panels.
The strategy we adopt is to draw first S market return samples and check which samples meet the systemic event condition. For each of these samples, we store the sequence of draws' dates. Then, for each individual firm, we sample directly the sequence of firm innovations corresponding to those dates. This speeds up the simulations in that it avoids having to simulate and select paths for each firm/market return pair in the panel.
A.2 Time-Varying Copula Model
Several time-varying copula models have been introduced in the literature. Among other proposals, we consider the Dynamic Rotated Gumbel model put forward in Patton (2006) .
We choose this particular specification since Patton (2006) documents that it performs well empirically relative to a set of alternative dynamic copula models. Let F m t and F i t denote the conditional marginal cumulative distributions of market logarithmic returns r m t and firm logarithmic returns r i t . In particular, in this work we consider these to be the marginal conditional distributions implied by a GJR-GARCH model with (unspecified) marginal innovation distributions D m and D i (analogously to the GARCH-DCC presented in Section 2.2). We then define the uniform margins of the market and firm returns as
that is the probability integral transformations of the returns series obtained from their marginal conditional distributions. Dynamic copula models specify a time-varying conditional copula function for the market and firm returns. This is equivalent to specifying a time-varying cumulative distribution function for the uniform margins
The copula function allows to capture the time-varying dependence structure between the series. In particular, the rotated Gumbel copula uses one parameter to determine the degree of dependence in the lower tail. The distribution is defined as
where δ t ∈ [1, ∞) is the parameter determining the degree of dependence. We assume the parameter evolves according to the following autoregressive equation
Note that this formulation ensures that δ t is always greater than one so that the copula distribution is well defined. Details on the estimation of the model and additional
properties are provided in Patton (2006) . In particular, the model is fitted by estimating the marginal models first and then by maximizing the copula likelihood using the fitted uniform margins. The table reports the 10%, 50% and 90% quantiles of the GJR-GARCH and DCC paramaters estimates dividided by sub-industry group. The parameter estimates are obtained over the full sample, which spans January 2005 to December 2012. The table reports estimation results of the predictive regressions of equation (7) for industrial production using a forecasting horizon ranging from 1 month to 12 months ahead. For each predictive horizon, the The table reports summary estimation results of the predictive regressions of industrial production growth rates (left panel) and the unemployment rate changes (right panel). Row (a) presents estimation results based on the model of equation (7), while rows (b), (c), (d) report estimation results based on the model of (8) where the additional predictor z t is set to, respectively, non-financial SRISK, VIX, and TES. Columns (1) and (2) report estimation results based on the specifications with and without control predictors respectively. The table reports the joint F-test for the significance of the SRISK coefficients across multiple horizons (1 to 3 months, 4 to 6 months, 7 to 9 months and 10 to 12 months) in the different specifications. Moreover, the table shows the joint F-test for the significance of the dependent variable, non-financial SRISK, VIX and TES coefficients across the same multiple horizons, as well as the average adjusted R 2 across the same horizons. Asterisks are used to denote significance at standard significance levels ( * =0.10, * * =0.05 and * * * =0.01). 
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The table reports the results of the Granger causality test among the SRISK indices based on different LRMES estimators. For each pair of LRMES estimators (GARCH-DCC, static normal, dynamic copula), the table reports the estimated β coefficient of equation (9), its standard error and the adjusted R 2 of the predictive regression. Asterisks are used to denote significance at standard significance levels ( * =0.10, * * =0.05 and * * * =0.01). 
